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The Writing on the Wall: The Potential Liability of 
Mediators as Fiduciaries 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The number of potential fiduciary relationships is continuously 
evolving to adjust to changing economic and social conditions.1 As 
one scholar noted, “The twentieth century is witnessing an 
unprecedented expansion and development of the fiduciary law.”2 
Historically, courts have intentionally refrained from specifically 
defining the scope of fiduciary duties in an effort to keep the 
definition of a fiduciary open to new possibilities and situations. 
Indeed, in 1924 the Oklahoma Supreme Court observed, “Courts of 
equity have carefully refrained from defining the particular instances 
of fiduciary relations in such a manner that other and perhaps new 
cases might be excluded.”3 As the Oklahoma Supreme Court further 
explained, “The expression ‘fiduciary relation’ is one of broad 
meaning, including both technical fiduciary relations and those 
informal relations which exist when one man trusts and relies upon 
another.”4 Over the past few decades in particular, courts have 
increasingly extended the designation of “informal fiduciary” under 
certain factual circumstances to individuals—including some clergy,5 
educators,6 travel agents,7 and even parents8—who have not 
 
 1. See GEORGE GLEASON BOGERT, THE LAW OF TRUSTS & TRUSTEES § 7, at 29 (2d 
ed. 1984) (“Since 1800 there has been a great expansion and development in the law of trusts 
in order to adapt it to changing economic and social conditions.”). 
 2. Tamara Frankel, Fiduciary Law, 71 CAL. L. REV. 795, 796 (1983). 
 3. Reeves v. Crum, 225 P. 177, 179 (Okla. 1924) (citation omitted); see also Konover 
Dev. Corp. v. Zeller, 635 A.2d 798, 806 (Conn. 1994) (“The Connecticut Supreme Court 
has purposefully refrained from defining ‘a fiduciary relationship in precise detail and in such a 
manner as to exclude new situations.’” (quoting Harper v. Ademetz, 113 A.2d 136, 139 
(Conn. 1955))). 
 4. Reeves, 225 P. at 179. 
 5. Destefano v. Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988); Erickson v. Christenson, 
781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. 1989). 
 6. Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Johnson v. Schmitz, 
119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98 (D. Conn. 2000). 
 7. Maurer v. Cerkvenik-Anderson Travel, Inc., 890 P.2d 69, 71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 1994); 
Rodriguez v. Cardona Travel Bureau, 523 A.2d 281, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986). 
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traditionally been considered inherent fiduciaries. Although courts, 
and most scholars, have not yet recognized fiduciary liability for 
mediators, this paper suggests that certain legal mediation 
relationships are a likely future addition to this list. This paper 
further argues that, applied correctly, the law of fiduciary duties can 
provide an appropriate, effective, and predictable means of defining 
and regulating obligations owed by mediators to their clients in 
certain mediation relationships. 
Part II provides background information on the law of fiduciary 
duties, particularly the characteristics of both formal and informal 
fiduciary relationships, and on the characteristics and regulation of 
the growing mediation profession. Part III details the current trends 
that will likely lead to a future increase in claims against mediators 
based on breaches of fiduciary duties. Part IV discusses the 
consequent likelihood that courts will eventually hold some 
mediators liable for fiduciary duties. This section includes the 
academic debate throughout the past two decades and discusses why 
most scholars and mediators, along with the courts, have dismissed 
the idea that mediators owe clients fiduciary duties and thus can be 
held liable for breaches of those duties. 
Part V discusses the unpredictability of the traditional approach 
to determining fiduciary liability and describes a new fact-based 
analytical framework, developed by Professors Brett G. Scharffs and 
John W. Welch,9 to both identify the factors which likely heighten a 
mediator’s duty and to provide a guide for mediators on how to 
prevent the attachment of fiduciary duties. This section provides a 
discussion of recent cases in which courts have declined to hold a 
mediator to the enhanced duties of a fiduciary. When analyzed under 
the Scharffs-Welch framework, the language of these rulings 
indicates the strong possibility of holding mediators liable as 
fiduciaries under specific factual circumstances when the magnitude 
of the breach is particularly extreme. Part VI confronts and attempts 
to overcome, through the use of the Scharffs-Welch framework, 
several of the concerns voiced by opponents of extending fiduciary 
duties to mediators. Part VII provides a brief conclusion. 
 
 8. Hieble v. Heible, 316 A.2d 777, 780 (Conn. 1972); Swift v. Ball, No. 
CV010344047S, 2005 WL 648145, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005). 
 9. Brett G. Scharffs & John W. Welch, An Analytic Framework for Understanding and 
Evaluating the Fiduciary Duties of Educators, 2005 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 159. 
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It should be emphasized at the outset that the purpose of this 
paper is not to encourage litigation against a group of professionals 
who offer society an important alternative to litigation.10 Rather, this 
paper attempts to consider the potential fiduciary liability of 
mediators in order to improve the quality of mediation service. 
Analyzing the nature of mediation relationships under an analytic 
framework of fiduciary duty can help practitioners not only identify 
the existence or lack of fiduciary relationships more effectively but 
also assess individual circumstances to prevent, or at least predict, the 
attachment of fiduciary liability. This paper demonstrates that in at 
least some mediation proceedings a strong argument can be made 
that mediators owe some degree of fiduciary obligations to the 
parties—primarily confidentiality, disclosure of conflicts of interest, 
and good faith. While all mediation relationships will probably not 
rise to this higher level of duty, the analytical factors discussed 
provide a guide for determining the likelihood, in particular factual 
circumstances, that a court might find a mediator liable for fiduciary 
obligations in the future. 
II. BACKGROUND 
A. Fiduciary Duty 
The law of fiduciaries provides an equitable doctrine exception to 
the normal expectations of conduct in a laissez-faire society by legally 
punishing the pursuit of one’s self interest at the expense of another 
in certain relationships where protecting a high level of trust is 
essential. Courts have found that while a fiduciary relationship “may 
exist under a variety of circumstances; it exists in all cases where there 
has been a special confidence reposed in one who in equity and good 
conscience is bound to act in good faith and with due regard to the 
interests of the one reposing confidence.”11 Thus, while no 
definition has been derived that is flexible enough to specifically 
cover all fiduciary situations,12 a fiduciary relationship typically exists 
 
 10. See Arthur A. Chaykin, Mediator Liability: A New Role for Fiduciary Duties?, 53 U. 
CIN. L. REV. 731, 733 (1984). 
 11. Stone v. McClam, 257 S.E.2d 78, 83 (N.C. Ct. App. 1979), quoted in HAJMM Co. 
v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 483, 489 (N.C. 1991). 
 12. See Gregory B. Westfall, “But I Know It When I See It”: A Practical Framework for 
Analysis and Argument of Informal Fiduciary Relationships, 23 TEX. TECH L. REV. 835, 836 
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when there is a special relationship of confidence and trust imposed 
and a position of superiority or influence results by virtue of this 
special trust.13 
Once a court establishes that a fiduciary relationship exists 
between two or more parties, the fiduciary (the party in a position of 
influence) is liable to the beneficiaries (the parties who trust and rely 
on the fidelity of the fiduciary) for certain duties. The complexity of 
fiduciary law lies in the vast number of statutes and court opinions, 
arising in almost all areas of law, that deal with defining and applying 
these fiduciary duties. Justice Cardozo, while sitting for the New 
York Court of Appeals in Meinhard v. Salmon, provided the most 
famous explanation of the high standard of duty that should apply to 
fiduciaries: 
Many forms of conduct permissible in a workaday world for those 
acting at arm’s length, are forbidden to those bound by fiduciary 
ties. A trustee is held to something stricter than the morals of the 
market place. Not honesty alone, but the punctilio of an honor the 
most sensitive, is then the standard of behavior. As to this there has 
developed a tradition that is unbending and inveterate.14 
The Supreme Court acknowledged the lack of any comprehensive list 
of fiduciary duties when it explained, “rather than explicitly 
enumerating all of the powers and duties of trustees and other 
fiduciaries, Congress invoked the common law of trusts to define the 
general scope of their authority and responsibility.”15 Such duties 
could include the duty to not commit fraud, gross negligence, or 
intentional wrongdoing; to act with care and prudence; to obey 
pertinent instructions; to be loyal, diligent, and exercise good faith; 
to voluntarily disclose material information; to avoid self-dealing or 
self-interested conduct; and to take the initiative in behalf of 
 
(1992) (stating that finding an exact definition of “fiduciary” reminds one of Justice Stewart’s 
predicament in deriving a workable definition for “pornography,” when he stated, “I know it 
when I see it . . . .” (quoting Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 197 (1964) (Stewart, J., 
concurring))). 
 13. See, e.g., Anchor v. O’Toole, 94 F.3d 1014, 1023 (6th Cir. 1996) (“[A] fiduciary 
relation is one in which a ‘special confidence and trust is reposed in the integrity and fidelity of 
another and there is a resulting position of superiority or influence, acquired by virtue of this 
special trust.’” (quoting Craggett v. Adell Ins. Agency, 635 N.E.2d 1326, 1331 (Ohio Ct. 
App. 1993))). 
 14. Meinhard v. Salmon, 164 N.E. 545, 546 (N.Y. 1928). 
 15. Pegram v. Herdrich, 530 U.S. 211, 224 (2000). 
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beneficiaries.16 Once a court establishes the existence of a fiduciary 
relationship, any or all of these duties may be applied depending on 
the factual circumstances and the degree of formality of the 
relationship under which the fiduciary duties occur. 
Courts have identified two basic types of fiduciary relationships: 
formal and informal.17 As one commentator explained, “Formal 
fiduciary relationships arise as a matter of law based on the status of 
the parties. Conversely, informal confidential relationships, and the 
accompanying fiduciary obligations, are determined from the unique 
facts pertaining to the parties’ particular relationship.”18 Some legal 
relationships are so typically imbued with inherent qualities of trust, 
confidence, and good faith that courts have been able to comfortably 
assume that, in the absence of evidence to the contrary, a formal 
fiduciary relationship must exist. For example, the Fifth Circuit 
Court of Appeals has noted that “certain formal fiduciary 
relationships, such as principal/agent, attorney/client, partnership 
and trustee-cestui que trust, give rise to fiduciary duties as a matter 
of law.”19 Based on the inherent trust and reliance associated with 
their positions, the list of commonly accepted formal fiduciaries 
includes corporate officers, agents, partners, lawyers, guardians, 
employers, and trustees.20 Much of the well-established law of 
fiduciaries deals with these formal relationships, and fiduciaries in 
these relationships are generally held to the highest levels of fiduciary 
duties. 
Courts have additionally found that informal confidential 
relationships may also give rise to some fiduciary duties in certain 
factual circumstances when a special relationship of trust is 
 
 16. See BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 658 (8th ed. 2004); RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF 
TRUSTS § 170 (1992). 
 17. See, e.g., Lee v. LPP Mortg. Ltd., 74 P.3d 152, 160 (Wyo. 2003) (quoting 
Associated Indem. Corp. v. CAT Contracting, Inc., 964 S.W.2d 276, 287 (Tex. 1998)). 
 18. Roy Ryden Anderson, The Wolf at the Campfire: Understanding Confidential 
Relationships, 53 SMU L. REV. 315, 325 (2000). 
 19. Imperial Premium Fin., Inc. v. Khoury, 129 F.3d 347, 353 (5th Cir. 1997) (citing 
ARA Auto. Group v. Cent. Garage, Inc., 124 F.3d 720, 723 (5th Cir. 1997)). 
 20. See, e.g., City of Aurora v. Colo. State Eng’r, 105 P.3d 595, 622 (Colo. 2005) 
(citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF AGENCY § 1(1) (1957) (defining agency as a fiduciary 
relation)); Willis v. Maverick, 760 S.W.2d 642, 645 (Tex. 1988) (“A fiduciary relationship 
exists between attorney and client.”). 
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established.21 This second type of fiduciary relationship is not based 
on the trust and reliance inherent to the type of relationship itself 
but is instead “implied in law due to the factual situation 
surrounding the involved transaction, and the relationship of the 
parties to each other and to the transaction.”22 Courts have explained 
that a “fiduciary relationship need not be created by contract,” and 
certain types of fiduciary duties can occasionally arise in select non-
contractual relationships.23 Particularly in these informal 
relationships, courts have found that the attachment of fiduciary 
obligations is not driven by title or status alone, but rather by varying 
factual circumstances determined through a fact-specific analysis. For 
example, the Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals has held that “the 
existence of a fiduciary relation is a question of fact which properly 
should be resolved by looking to the particular facts and 
circumstances of the relationship at issue.”24 
Courts have found that such informal relationships may establish 
certain fiduciary duties when the facts indicate a “confidential 
relationship”25 in which “one person trusts in and relies upon 
another, whether the relation is a moral, social, domestic or merely 
personal one.”26 For example, fiduciary liability has been applied to 
clergy members when the “plaintiff’s claim . . . is not premised on 
the mere fact that [the defendant] is a pastor, but on the fact that, 
because he was plaintiff’s pastor and counselor, a special relationship 
of trust and confidence developed.”27 Similarly, certain university 
 
 21. See, e.g., Stone v. Davis, 419 N.E.2d 1094, 1098 (Ohio 1981) (“[A] fiduciary 
relationship . . . may arise out of an informal relationship where both parties understand that a 
special trust or confidence has been reposed.”). 
 22. Lee, 74 P.3d at 160. 
 23. Stone, 419 N.E.2d at 1098. 
 24. In re Daisy Sys. Corp., 97 F.3d 1171, 1178 (9th Cir. 1996); see also Crim Truck & 
Tractor Co. v. Navistar Int’l Transp. Corp., 823 S.W.2d 591, 594 (Tex. 1992) (holding that 
the existence of an informal fiduciary relationship is a question of fact unless the “issue is one 
of no evidence”); Michael Moffitt, Suing Mediators, 83 B.U. L. REV. 147, 167 (2003) (stating 
that the attachment of fiduciary obligations is driven by circumstances and thus “the inquiry 
about the existence of fiduciary duties is fact specific”). 
 25. Lee, 74 P.3d at 160. 
 26. Crim Truck, 823 S.W.2d at 594 (quoting Fitz-Gerald v. Hull, 237 S.W.2d 256, 
261 (Tex. 1951)). 
 27. Erickson v. Christenson, 781 P.2d 383, 386 (Or. 1989); see also Destefano v. 
Grabrian, 763 P.2d 275, 284 (Colo. 1988) (finding that a priest who “holds himself out to 
the community as a professional or trained marriage counselor” had a fiduciary duty to 
counseled members); Ira C. Lupu & Robert W. Tuttle, Sexual Misconduct and Ecclesiastical 
Immunity, 2004 BYU L. REV. 1789; Brett G. Scharffs & Cheryl Preston, The Religious 
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educators have been found liable for breaches of their fiduciary duty 
of loyalty based not on their status as professors but rather on their 
blatant pursuit of self-interest at the great expense of trusting 
students.28 Courts have also extended fiduciary duties of care to 
travel agents for failing to disclose known dangers of travel.29 Courts 
have even acknowledged that while “the bond between parent and 
child is not per se a fiduciary one; it does generate, however, a natural 
inclination to repose great confidence and trust.”30 Thus, while the 
category of formal fiduciaries seems to be fairly established and 
limited, the emergence of informal fiduciary relationships is more 
fluid and open to new factual circumstances that satisfy the need to 
protect trusting parties from certain breaches of that trust. 
This flexibility allows for the possibility of expanding the 
definition of fiduciary relationships to include circumstances such as 
mediation, and it ensures that the designation of fiduciary duties is 
not limited to only formal fiduciary relationships. Such fluidity can 
also lead to uncertainty about when and to what degree fiduciary 
duties apply in informal relationships of trust, and thus, under the 
traditional doctrinal approach to fiduciary analysis, potential informal 
fiduciaries cannot adequately predict if they must act with a higher 
duty than normally required for their type of relationship status. A 
more structured analytical framework, such as that described in Part 
V, is thus needed to ensure a greater degree of predictability in 
determining both the existence of an informal fiduciary relationship 
and the extent to which fiduciary duties apply in that relationship. 
 
Judgment Rule and the Fiduciary Duties of Clergy (Feb. 2005) (unpublished article, on file 
with author). 
 28. See Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1362 (Fed. Cir. 2001); Johnson v. 
Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 98 (D. Conn. 2000); see also Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 
160; Ronna Greff Schneider, Sexual Harassment and Higher Education, 65 TEX. L. REV. 525, 
552 (1987) (describing faculty-student relationships as fiduciary relationships). 
 29. See Maurer v. Cerkvenik-Anderson Travel, Inc., 890 P.2d 69, 71 (Ariz. Ct. App. 
1994) (holding the travel agent potentially violated fiduciary duty of care by failing to warn 
customer of the train’s known history of drunken college student fatalities); Rodriguez v. 
Cardona Travel Bureau, 523 A.2d 281, 284 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. 1986) (finding that 
travel agent violated fiduciary duty in failing to explain risks of travel with charter carrier that 
later went bankrupt). 
 30. Hieble v. Heible, 316 A.2d 777, 780 (Conn. 1972); see also Swift v. Ball, No. 
CV010344047S, 2005 WL 648145, at *8 (Conn. Super. Ct. Feb. 22, 2005) (“[R]elationships 
that generate a natural inclination to trust, such as brother-brother or parent-child . . . also 
supply a strong indicium of a fiduciary relationship.” (quoting Martinelli v. Bridgeport Roman 
Catholic Diocesan, 10 F. Supp. 2d 138, 154 (D. Conn. 1998))). 
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B. Mediation 
In essence, mediation is a voluntary legal process engaged in by 
disputing parties who choose to decide the resolution of their 
dispute themselves, under the direction of an impartial third party 
mediator, rather than submitting to the imposition of a judicial 
ruling through traditional litigation. The mediator facilitates 
negotiation “to assist disputing parties in voluntarily reaching their 
own mutually acceptable” compromises tailored to the needs and 
interests of both parties without the relatively higher costs associated 
with a more formal legal proceeding or even an arbitration.31 The 
Model Standards of Conduct recently adopted by the American Bar 
Association, American Arbitration Association, and the Association 
for Conflict Resolution set forth the following five specific objectives 
of mediation: “Providing the opportunity for parties to define and 
clarify issues, understand different perspectives, identify interests, 
explore and assess possible solutions, and reach mutually satisfactory 
agreements, when desired.”32 
In an age of increasing legal conflicts, the benefits of mediation 
have drawn many who want to avoid the complexity and adversarial 
nature of litigation to resolve their disputes through alternative 
methods such as mediation. Mediation offers expedited resolutions, 
cost savings, confidentiality, privacy, self-determination of the 
resolution by the parties, the opportunity for preserving relationships 
between parties, informality, flexibility, and mutually agreeable 
resolutions. The informality of the mediation process also allows 
almost anyone to serve in the role of mediator as long as the 
mediator fulfills any relevant state requirements for mediation 
certification or training. All states acknowledge that both lawyers and 
non-lawyers can serve as professional mediators, although wide 
national disparity persists concerning the proper standards and 
requirements for mediator certification.33 Additionally, at least one 
study has provided statistically significant data that alternative dispute 
 
 31. Ronald J. Hedges, Mediation Developments & Trends, SK042 A.L.I.–A.B.A. 1485, 
1487 (2005) (quoting Saeta v. Superior Ct., 11 Cal. Rptr. 3d 610, 616 (Ct. App. 2004)). 
 32. AM. BAR ASS’N ET AL., MODEL STANDARDS OF CONDUCT FOR MEDIATORS 2 
(2005), http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal 
05.pdf. 
 33. See Richard Birke & Louise Ellen Teitz, U.S. Mediation in 2001: The Path That 
Brought America to Uniform Laws and Mediation in Cyberspace, 50 AM. J. COMP. L. 181, 
191–92 (2002). 
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resolution programs increase the likelihood of a monetary 
settlement.34 Other sources indicate that participation in the 
mediation process generally contributes to greater satisfaction for 
both parties involved.35 For these reasons, the presence of the 
mediation profession has grown substantially in the last few 
decades.36 
Throughout its short history, the use of mediation as a method 
of alternative dispute resolution has developed without the guidance 
of a consistent or comprehensive regulatory system. Starting in the 
1960s, mediation emerged as a viable alternative to litigation in non-
mainstream areas of law such as labor management, and 
neighborhood and domestic relations disputes.37 While mediation 
remained circumscribed within these limited areas, the need for 
regulation never arose as a prominent issue.38 Throughout the 1970s 
and 1980s, mediation expanded into an industry impacting nearly all 
aspects of law. At the illustrious Pound Conference in 1976, 
Professor Frank Sander described his vision of a future “multi-door 
courthouse” that would divert a substantial amount of cases to non-
litigation processes.39 By prominently including the use of mediation 
in his model, Sander’s call for reform marks the critical moment 
when the legal community first officially acknowledged the potential 
of mediation to play an influential role in the future of dispute 
resolution.40 
Since that time, mediation has rapidly become more and more 
institutionalized in society with the dramatic escalation of the use of 
alternative dispute resolution in recent years. Indeed, over the past 
few decades, the mediation profession has “grown in epic 
 
 34. See Hedges, supra note 31, at 1489. 
 35. See, e.g., Chris Guthrie & James Levin, A “Party Satisfaction” Perspective on a 
Comprehensive Mediation Statute, 13 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 885, 887 n.7 (1998). 
 36. See Charles Pou, Jr., Assuring Excellence, or Merely Reassuring? Policy and Practice 
In Promoting Mediator Quality, 2004 J. DISP. RESOL. 303, 303 (“Mediation practice has 
grown substantially over the last two decades . . . .”); Evan Spelfogel, New Trends in the 
Arbitration of Employment Disputes, ARB. J., Mar. 1993, at 6. 
 37. See Birke & Teitz, supra note 33, at 182–83. 
 38. See id. at 186. 
 39. Frank E. A. Sander, Varieties of Dispute Processing, in THE POUND CONFERENCE: 
PERSPECTIVES ON JUSTICE IN THE FUTURE 65 (A. Leo Levin & Russell R. Wheeler eds., 
1979). 
 40. See Paula M. Young, Rejoice! Rejoice! Rejoice, Give Thanks, and Sing: The ABA, 
ACR, and AAA Adopt Revised Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators, 5 APPALACHIAN 
J.L. 195, 200 (2006). 
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proportions.”41 The Prefatory Note to the proposed Uniform 
Mediation Act explains that 
[d]uring the last thirty years the use of mediation has expanded 
beyond its century-long home in collective bargaining to become 
an integral and growing part of the processes of dispute resolution 
in the courts, public agencies, community dispute resolution 
programs, and the commercial and business communities, as well as 
among private parties engaged in conflict.42 
One commentator observed this growth and warned, “The practice 
of mediation, like computerized electronic transfers, is growing so 
rapidly and in such unpredictable ways that it may be folly to 
presently attempt to capture the future in binding legislation.”43 This 
concern for preserving the flexibility of mediation has not hindered 
the passage of numerous statutes relating to mediation, but may have 
restrained many lawmakers from entering into a nationally 
standardized approach to mediation and from engaging in a 
significant degree of formal regulation of the profession. 
The significant and recent growth in this area has left many 
courts, lawmakers, and scholars unsure about how to approach 
mediation from a legal perspective.44 A Harvard Law Review article 
in 1986 observed, “The recent spread of informal methods of 
dispute resolution into new areas has galvanized a debate regarding 
the legal character of one of the most popular informal specialists, 
the mediator.”45 This debate continues today. Mediation is still a 
fairly unregulated service, and few formal quality control mechanisms 
exist. Currently, the legal rules affecting mediation are complex, 
 
 41. Pamela A. Kentra, Hear No Evil, See No Evil, Speak No Evil: The Intolerable Conflict 
for Attorney-Mediators Between the Duty To Maintain Mediation Confidentiality and the Duty 
To Report Fellow Attorney Misconduct, 1997 BYU L. REV. 715, 719; see also Birke & Teitz, 
supra note 33 at 182–83. 
 42. NATIONAL CONFERENCE OF COMISSIONERS ON UNIFORM STATE LAWS, UNIFORM 
MEDIATION ACT, Prefatory Note (2003), http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/ 
2003finaldraft.pdf. 
 43. Hedges, supra note 31, at 1500. 
 44. See ROBERT A. BARUCH BUSH & JOSEPH P. FOLGER, THE PROMISE OF 
MEDIATION: RESPONDING TO CONFLICT THROUGH EMPOWERMENT AND RECOGNITION 15 
(1994) (“While the growth of mediation in the past two decades is remarkable, what is even 
more striking is the extraordinary divergence of opinion about how to understand that growth 
and how to characterize the mediation movement itself.”). 
 45. Note, The Sultans of Swap: Defining the Duties and Liabilities of American 
Mediators, 99 HARV. L. REV. 1876, 1876 (1986) [hereinafter Sultans of Swap]. 
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scattered, and inconsistent.46 The widespread success of mediation as 
an alternative form of dispute resolution has now engendered more 
than 2500 state and federal statutes attempting to institutionalize 
mediation.47 These statutes establish mediation programs in a wide 
variety of contexts and encourage or even mandate their use.48 Many 
states have also created offices to encourage greater use of 
mediation.49 However, such a plethora of regulations leads to 
complexity in the law and a lack of uniformity, which result in 
uncertainty over how and when to apply the statutes, especially in a 
multi-state context.50 Furthermore, these numerous statutes contain 
almost no standardization for such important issues as mediation 
certification requirements, ethical standards, confidentiality 
requirements, evidentiary privileges against disclosure in legal 
proceedings, immunity from litigation for mediators, and quality 
control. 
Many scholars have expressed concern about the effect that 
inconsistencies in confidentiality protections, the lingering 
application to mediators of traditional immunity or quasi-immunity 
from litigation, few statutory or regulatory restrictions, and a lack of 
required credentialing have had, and will likely have in the future, on 
the quality of mediation.51 Commentators have regarded openness 
and confidentiality of disclosures as “pillars of mediation,” yet these 
commentators have also observed that 
the development of institutional protection for mediation 
confidentiality has been anything but uniform. Some states offer a 
mediation privilege that is held by the parties, and other 
jurisdictions vest a separate right in the mediator. Some states have 
 
 46. See Hedges, supra note 31, at 1498. 
 47. See Uniform Law Commissioners, Why States Should Adopt the Uniform Mediation 
Act (2001), http://www.nccusl.org/Update/uniformact_why/uniformacts-why-uma.asp (last 
visited Oct. 3, 2006). 
 48. See SARAH R. COLE, CRAIG A. MCEWEN & NANCY H. ROGERS, MEDIATION: LAW, 
POLICY, PRACTICE app. B (2d ed. 2001 & 2001 Supp.). 
 49. See, e.g., ARK. CODE ANN. § 16-7-102 (1995); HAW. REV. STAT. § 613-2 (1989); 
KAN. STAT. ANN. § 5-501 (1996); MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 7, § 51 (1998); NEB. REV. STAT. 
§ 25-2904 (1991); N.J. STAT. ANN. § 52:27E-73 (West 1994); OHIO REV. CODE ANN. 
§ 179.02 (West 1995); OKLA. STAT. tit. 12, § 1803.1 (1983); OR. REV. STAT. § 36.105 
(1997); W. VA. CODE § 55-15-2 (1990). 
 50. See Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 47. 
 51. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 24. 
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clear rules about ‘mandatory reporting’ (of various offenses, like 
child abuse) while others have more opaque rules or none at all.52 
And some scholars call for full immunity for mediators based on their 
quasi-judicial role,53 whereas others argue that “[m]ediator immunity 
represents the inequitable shifting of risk of mediator misconduct 
from the mediators and the courts to those mediation participants 
least able to protect themselves from or shoulder the burden of such 
negative behavior.”54 These inconsistencies hinder any 
comprehensive regulation of mediation. Commentator Michael 
Moffitt has consequently observed, “As the use of mediation 
explodes in popularity, assuring the quality of mediation services has 
become an increasingly visible challenge.”55 Moffitt explains that 
“[m]ost occupations and professions have credentialing or other 
barriers to entry into practice, statutory or regulatory restrictions on 
practice methods, and oversight of some sort. . . . In contrast, 
mediation operates with few, if any, formal structures for assuring 
the quality of mediation services.”56 
Recent efforts have been made to pass more standardized 
regulations and ethical codes for mediation, including a proposed 
Uniform Mediation Act (“UMA”) and Model Standards of Conduct 
for Mediators.57 Referring to the multitude of inconsistent statutes 
currently affecting mediation, one commentator remarked, “Many of 
those statutes can be replaced by the [UMA], which applies a generic 
approach to topics that are covered in varying ways by a number of 
specific statutes currently scattered within substantive provisions.”58 
The preface to the proposed UMA states, “In particular, the law 
has the unique capacity to assure that the reasonable expectations of 
participants regarding the confidentiality of the mediation process 
 
 52. Birke & Tietz, supra note 33, at 195–96; see also Owen V. Gray, Protecting the 
Confidentiality of Communications in Mediation, 36 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 667 (1998). 
 53. Joseph B. Stulberg, Mediator Immunity, 2 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 85, 85 
(1986). 
 54. Scott H. Hughes, Mediator Immunity: The Misguided and Inequitable Shifting of 
Risk, 83 OR. L. REV. 107, 111 (2004). 
 55. Moffitt, supra note 24, at 148. 
 56. Id. 
 57. The text of the UMA and the accompanying reporters’ notes are available at 
http://www.law.upenn.edu/bll/ulc/mediat/2003finaldraft.htm (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). 
The 2005 Model Standards of Conduct for Mediators are available at 
http://www.abanet.org/dispute/news/ModelStandardsofConductforMediatorsfinal05.pdf. 
 58. See Hedges, supra note 31, at 1498. 
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are met, rather than frustrated. For this reason, a central thrust of the 
Act is to provide a privilege that assures confidentiality in legal 
proceedings.”59 The National Conference of Commissioners on 
Uniform State Law adopted the UMA in 2001, and the American 
Bar Association approved it in 2002 primarily to provide uniform 
mediation standards and procedures to protect the confidentiality of 
mediations in subsequent litigation.60 The American Bar Association, 
the American Arbitration Association, and the Association for 
Conflict Resolution also recently adopted Model Standards of 
Conduct for Mediators, which provide uniform ethical and conduct 
standards to better protect the quality of mediation for clients.61 
While the UMA and the Model Standards of Conduct have not yet 
been adopted by many states and thus do not have the force of law, 
they indicate a trend toward increased regulation of mediation to 
address the need for quality control and accountability of mediators 
for misconduct. 
The probable future standardization of mediation rules and 
conduct standards will likely increase the potential for litigation 
based on mediator misconduct. The current lack of such standards, 
and thus of any clearly discernable duty of care upon which a court 
could base a ruling, has been cited as a leading obstacle to currently 
holding mediators liable for misconduct.62 But as standards of 
conduct for mediators become more institutionalized through the 
passage of more standardized regulations, the duties for which courts 
can hold mediators accountable for misconduct and ethical violations 
will become more clear, and it will become easier to establish 
liability. 
The UMA acknowledges the potential for litigation against 
mediators by permitting disclosure of a mediation communication 
(as an exception to the mediation privilege of confidentiality 
established in the UMA) if the communication is sought or offered 
to prove or disprove a claim or complaint “of professional 
misconduct or malpractice” against a mediator.63 The New Jersey 
State Bar Association has acknowledged this proposed provision and 
 
 59. See UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT, supra note 42, at Prefatory Note. 
 60. See Uniform Law Commissioners, supra note 47. 
 61. See supra note 57. 
 62. Moffitt, supra note 24, at 168. 
 63. UNIFORM MEDIATION ACT, supra note 42, at § 6(5). 
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noted that if the UMA is adopted by the states, “[I]t might be 
possible to argue that the legislature has indirectly created a new 
cause of action of professional misconduct or professional 
malpractice for mediators, where one did not exist before.”64 
Another commentator has also warned mediators that ethics 
codes, even aspirational codes such as the 2005 Model Standards of 
Conduct, “can establish a standard of care for mediators that tort 
lawyers will reference when attempting to prove mediator 
malpractice.”65 The note on construction for the Model Standards of 
Conduct also explicitly acknowledges this risk, stating, 
These standards, unless and until adopted by a court or other 
regulatory authority do not have the force of law. Nonetheless, the 
fact that these Standards have been adopted by the respective 
sponsoring entities, should alert mediators to the fact that the 
Standards might be viewed as establishing a standard of care for 
mediators.66 
As discussed below, this increased litigation against mediators 
resulting from more standardized regulations could effectively 
include the possibility of claims for fiduciary liability when a 
mediator severely breaches his duties. 
III. CURRENT TRENDS LEADING TO THE LIKELIHOOD OF FUTURE 
MEDIATOR FIDUCIARY DUTY CLAIMS 
As described above, recent decades have witnessed both the 
expanding category of informal fiduciaries to whom fiduciary liability 
may be applied in certain factual circumstances as well as the 
increasing popularity of mediation as an alternative to litigation.67 
Against the backdrop of today’s increasingly litigious society, these 
concurrent trends lead to a resulting increase in the concern of 
mediators about liability insurance to protect against litigation. The 
trends also lead to the likelihood of an increase in fiduciary duty 
claims against mediators in the future. This section explores the 
intersection of these trends and concludes that not only will lawsuits 
against mediators continue to generally increase, but also, more 
 
 64. New Jersey State Bar Association, Report Regarding the Uniform Mediation Act  (on 
file with author), quoted in Hedges, supra note 31, at 1563. 
 65. Young, supra note 40, at 208. 
 66. AMERICAN BAR ASSOCIATION ET AL., supra note 32, at 3. 
 67. See supra Part II.B. 
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specifically, mediators will increasingly face lawsuits based on claims 
of breach of the mediators’ fiduciary duties. These trends in current 
society thus provide the basis for the argument in Part IV that future 
courts will likely expand the category of informal fiduciary to include 
mediators who substantially violate their ethical duties. If courts 
apply the analytical framework discussed in Part V, this eventual 
application of fiduciary law to certain mediators could provide a 
more effective, appropriate, and predictable means of defining and 
regulating the obligations of mediation relationships. 
American society has become increasingly litigious as more 
people turn to attorneys and the courts to resolve disputes. 
Consequently, tort reform has become a major national issue at the 
forefront of public policy discussions.68 Many commentators have 
expressed concern about this trend of seeking legal solutions to every 
type of problem in every type of relationship.69 As one commentator 
observed, “Litigation has become our national pastime.”70 In spite of 
efforts to reform the legal process, litigation remains a significant 
threat to those who provide a variety of services. Professionals such 
as physicians, attorneys, and even teachers have been forced to take 
steps to protect themselves against liability.71 Although litigation 
against mediators remains as yet minimal compared to other 
professions, as mediation continues to become more institutionalized 
it is likely that the trend of litigiousness will increasingly affect 
 
 68. See, e.g., George W. Bush, Legal Reform: The High Costs of Lawsuit Abuse, 
http://www.whitehouse.gov/infocus/medicalliability (last visited Mar. 21, 2006) (“The costs 
of litigation per person in the United States are far higher than in any other major 
industrialized nation in the world. Lawsuit costs have risen substantially over the past several 
decades. . . . This explosion in litigation is creating a logjam in America’s civil courts and 
threatening jobs across America.”). 
 69. See PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE COLLAPSE OF THE COMMON GOOD: HOW AMERICA’S 
LAWSUIT CULTURE UNDERMINES OUR FREEDOM (2002); PHILIP K. HOWARD, THE DEATH 
OF COMMON SENSE: HOW LAW IS SUFFOCATING AMERICA (1996); Mortimer B. Zuckerman, 
Welcome To Sue City, U.S.A., U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP., June 16, 2003, at 64. 
 70. Zuckerman, supra note 69, at 64. 
 71. See Mark Carpenter, Education Not Litigation: The Paul D. Coverdell Teacher 
Liability Protection Act of 2001, CITIZENS FOR A SOUND ECON., Mar. 21, 2001, available at 
http://www.cse.org/informed/pdf_files/cc293_Teacher_Protection_Act.pdf (“[T]eachers are 
becoming more and more concerned each school year with the threat of lawsuits. In fact, a 
survey by the American Federation of Teachers shows that liability protection ranks among the 
top three concerns teachers want their unions to address.”); Jessica Portner, Fearful Teachers 
Buy Insurance Against Liability, EDUC. WK., Mar. 29, 2000 (showing that the number of 
teachers purchasing liability insurance increased 25 percent between 1995 and 2000). 
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mediators.72 More specifically, as statutory restrictions and 
regulations provide more formal parameters and more established 
duties for mediators, mediator liability and exposure to litigation is 
also likely to increase. The histories of both medical and attorney 
malpractice suits indicate that as mediation becomes more 
established professionally and economically, malpractice suits will 
likely follow.73 
Already, increasing litigation against service providers and 
professionals and the growth of a largely unregulated mediation 
profession, as described in Part II, have combined to produce a new 
trend—a burgeoning sense of apprehension about liability and 
potential litigation among mediators. At a 2004 symposium on 
mediator accountability, Alvin L. Zimmerman, a former Texas 
district court judge and current mediator, voiced his concerns about 
the future of the mediation profession and the threat that 
“malpractice will become a more oppressive industry” to mediators 
as the mediation profession becomes more established in society.74 
Zimmerman is not alone in these concerns. Michael Moffitt has also 
observed, “Despite the historical rarity of suits against mediators, 
many within the mediation community are demonstrating concern 
about the prospect of mediators being sued. An increasing number 
of jurisdictions and programs require mediators to carry liability 
 
 72. The trend of mediators’ relative freedom from lawsuits likely is not a result of 
mediators not making mistakes, but rather the result of several contributing factors, including 
the difficulty of succeeding on such claims, the immunity which sometimes extends to 
mediators, and the disputant’s disposition toward settlement and other non-adjudicative 
means, which would likely create a desire to resolve a dispute with the mediator without 
resorting to litigation. See Moffitt, supra note 24, at 150–53. 
 73. David I. Bristow & Jesmond Parke, The Gathering Storm of Mediator & Arbitrator 
Liability, 55 DISP. RESOL. J. 14, 16 ( 2000); see also Alvin L. Zimmerman et al., Mediator 
Accountability: Ethical and Legal Standards of the Profession, 28 AM. J. TRIAL ADVOC. 47, 61 
(2004) (“I almost parallel where we are today to an infant or burgeoning profession, almost 
like doctors in the early days. As long as doctors charged very little, made house calls, were 
courteous, and listened to the complaint of their patients, there were not malpractice claims to 
speak of. . . . I submit to you that, while we are infants, the public is putting up with us. As our 
fees increase, however, and as our obnoxiousness and independence grow more important, I 
believe that malpractice will become a more oppressive industry to those of us sitting in this 
room.”). 
 74. See Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 61. The very nature of this symposium 
indicates the increasing concern of mediators about the degree of their accountability and the 
potential threat of future malpractice litigation. 
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insurance.”75 Although mediators have traditionally been considered 
fairly protected from lawsuits,76 and although few claims have been 
filed against mediators and even fewer claims have succeeded,77 
mediators increasingly buy liability insurance; many jurisdictions and 
programs require mediators to carry such insurance.78 One scholar 
and mediator observed that, in his own experience, “the percentage 
of training time mediators spend asking about the prospect of 
liability has increased over the past decade.”79 Adding to this 
apprehension, a journal article in 2000 warned of a “gathering 
storm” of liability on the horizon about to strike mediators: “As 
lawyers, doctors, and indeed all professionals stood for so long 
seemingly immune from blame and liability, before the harsh winds 
of change struck them, so now our arbitrators and mediators carry 
on from day to day while the barometer is falling.”80 
No court has yet recognized mediation as a fiduciary 
relationship, but the issue of mediator liability is increasingly being 
discussed by the judiciary. While claims filed against mediators are 
still fairly uncommon, they have increased in recent years.81 Courts 
 
 75. Michael Moffitt, Ten Ways To Get Sued: A Guide for Mediators, 8 HARV. NEGOT. L. 
REV. 81, 83 (2003). 
 76. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 24, at 150–52 (“[I]t is extraordinarily difficult to sue a 
mediator successfully.”); see also Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 59–61. 
 77. See Moffitt, supra note 24, at 150–51; see also L. Wayne Scott, The Law of Mediation 
in Texas, 37 ST. MARY’S L.J. 325, 414–15 (2006) (“There are few reported Texas cases where 
actions have been filed against mediators, and none where a mediator has been held liable for 
any act or omission connected with the conduct of a mediation. It is unlikely that there will be 
many such cases, because any plaintiff will have to show that an act or omission of the mediator 
caused some legal injury.”). 
 78. See, e.g., Cuyahoga County, Ohio, Domestic Relations Rule 32(E)(4), 
http://domestic.cuyahogacounty.us/Rules/Rule32.htm (requiring mediators to have liability 
insurance) (last visited Oct. 3, 2006); Gotcha Covered: Your Professional Liability Insurance 
Coverage, AAM NEWSL., Feb. 2001, http://www.attorney-mediators.org/news200102.html 
(setting minimum liability insurance policy limits); West Virginia State Web Portal, Family 
Court-Ordered Mediation in West Virginia, http://www.state.wv.us/wvsca/familyct/ 
cover.htm (requiring mediators to have liability insurance) (last visited Oct. 3, 2006). 
 79. Moffitt, supra note 75, at 83. 
 80. Bristow & Parke, supra note 73, at 16. 
 81. See James R. Coben & Peter N. Thompson, Disputing Irony: A Systematic Look at 
Litigation About Mediation, 11 HARV. NEGOT. L. REV. 43, 47–49, 95, 98 (2006) (Analyzing 
all 1223 state and federal court mediation decisions available on the Westlaw databases 
“allstates” and “allfeds” for the years 1999 through 2003, and finding that in this five-year 
span when general civil case loads were relatively steady or declining nationwide, mediation 
litigation increased 95 percent, from 172 decisions in 1999 to 335 in 2003. Litigation 
concerning mediator misconduct as a contract defense was much more infrequent—only 
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largely dismiss these claims; there was only one reported case from all 
federal and state courts that found a mediator liable to a party for 
mediation misconduct, and in that case the defendant successfully 
appealed the jury award.82 The defendant asserted that his actions did 
not constitute negligence because, as a mediator rather than as an 
attorney, he owed no duty to perform the tasks the plaintiff claimed 
he had negligently failed to perform.83 The Court of Appeals 
specifically declined to resolve the precise nature of the defendant’s 
duties, resolving the matter on the issue of proximate causation 
instead and reversing the judgment.84 One commentator has noted 
that “[a]s a result, no cases exist in the official reporters in which a 
mediator ultimately paid a former client for injuries the mediator 
caused during mediation.”85  
Although lawsuits against mediators are minimal and suits where 
mediators lose are even more scarce, the number of lawsuits against 
mediators are increasing.86 As such litigation against mediators 
increases generally, fiduciary liability is one potential form that 
lawsuits may take.87 Such actions are still a novel concept. The few 
courts that have considered the idea of mediator liability, and 
specifically fiduciary liability, have rejected the idea. Yet there are 
indications that not only will such fiduciary claims eventually be 
brought against mediators, but also courts will likely find fiduciary 
duties to exist in certain situations. Indeed, although no court has 
yet clearly found such an existence of a fiduciary mediation 
relationship, the federal reporters record that in recent years at least 
one breach of fiduciary duty claim has in fact been filed against a 
 
seventeen cases in the five-year span—and the study revealed only four claims filed specifically 
naming mediators as defendants for misconduct.); see also Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 
57 (stating that only twenty-one claims have been made against mediators for misconduct and 
that those have occurred mainly since 2001 (citing statistics provided by Complete Equity 
Markets (on file with the authors of the article))). 
 82. See Lange v. Marshall, 622 S.W.2d 237, 238 (Mo. Ct. App. 1981) (holding that the 
party suing her attorney-mediator failed to establish that she suffered any damages proximately 
caused by the attorney-mediator’s misconduct); see also Coben & Thompson, supra note 81, at 
98 (citing a search of Westlaw and Lexis-Nexis databases on May 15, 2006 that yielded no 
reported cases in which the mediator was held liable for misconduct in his role as a mediator). 
 83. Lange, 622 S.W.2d at 238. 
 84. Id. at 238–39. 
 85. Moffitt, supra note 24, at 150–51. 
 86. See Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 56–57. 
 87. See Lela P. Love & John W. Cooley, The Intersection of Evaluation by Mediators and 
Informed Consent: Warning the Unwary, 21 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 45, 63 (2005). 
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mediator for misconduct.88 This claim indicates the potential for 
dissatisfied mediation clients to bring breach of fiduciary duty actions 
when seeking remedies for mediator misconduct. As discussed below 
in Part V, while the factual circumstances of this and other relevant 
cases did not rise to the level of breaches of duty serious enough to 
warrant the extension of fiduciary liability, these cases leave open the 
possibility that such liability may be found in certain other mediation 
situations. 
The expanding definition of informal fiduciaries, coupled with 
fiduciary-like duties such as confidentiality and good faith already 
inherent to mediation, make the mediation profession a viable 
candidate for courts to apply fiduciary liability in certain 
circumstances of extreme breaches of those duties. Although, as 
discussed in Part IV below, historically most commentators have 
argued that mediation and fiduciary law are incompatible, 
commentators Lela P. Love and John W. Cooley have recently 
explained: 
Mediators may violate the duty of trustworthiness by deceiving 
parties as to their credentials or by misinforming parties as to the 
kind of service that will be provided. Consequently, the failure to 
obtain the parties’ consent to the mediator’s provision of an 
evaluation may give rise to a cause of action for breach of fiduciary 
duty. Where a court finds the existence of a fiduciary relationship 
between a mediator and a party, the fiduciary will be under a 
special duty of full disclosure.89 
Although there is currently a lack of lawsuits brought against 
mediators under fiduciary law, the current trend appears to be 
heading in that direction. This possibility leads to the issue of 
whether, when confronting future lawsuits brought against 
mediators under fiduciary law, courts will find the existence of a 
fiduciary relationship and apply fiduciary liability. 
IV. EXTENDING FIDUCIARY DUTIES TO MEDIATORS 
Although the courts have thus far consistently refused to attach 
fiduciary duties to mediators, for the past couple of decades scholars 
have debated the extent of mediators’ duties to their clients, 
 
 88. Lehrer v. Zwernemann, 14 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Tex. App. 2000). 
 89. Love & Cooley, supra note 87, at 63. 
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including the possibility of holding those who practice mediation 
liable for breaches of fiduciary duties. As recently noted, 
“[c]urrently, the question of the legal nature and scope of the 
professional duties of mediators is an open one, as is the question of 
what the remedies might be if a mediator violates such unspecified 
duties.”90 
In 1984, Professor Arthur Chaykin first hypothesized that 
mediators could be, and in fact should be, considered to owe 
fiduciary duties.91 He argued that the essence of fiduciary duties can 
be discoverable in the principle of “justifiable trust.”92 He asserted 
that the concept of justifiable trust is “readily adaptable to the 
mediation context” because the “mediator actively seeks to gain the 
trust of the [parties] in order to maximize effectiveness,” the “parties 
rely on the mediator” to be honest and fair to both parties, and the 
“mediator has superior skill, experience, and information,” giving 
him a “powerful political position between the [two] parties.”93 He 
further argued that “[t]rust is such an essential element of the 
mediator’s work . . . that mediators generally should be held to the 
virtually per se rule applied to trustees and attorneys.”94 Thus, 
Chaykin’s arguments sought to attach the highest level of fiduciary 
duties to most, if not all, mediators and to include mediators in the 
category of the formal fiduciary. 
Chaykin’s arguments to extend fiduciary liability to mediators 
were immediately and justifiably met with criticism by mediators and 
mediation scholars, including those who wanted to protect the 
freedom from liability that mediators traditionally enjoyed. A 
Harvard Law Review article in 1986 accurately criticized Chaykin’s 
approach as an “overbroad formulation of mediators’ legal duties 
and liabilities.”95 It argued that “[t]he main shortcoming of the 
fiduciary model lies in its insistence on holding all mediators—
regardless of their compensation arrangements, institutional 
 
 90. Hedges, supra note 31, at 1563. 
 91. Chaykin, supra note 10, at 732. 
 92. Id. (“[T]he essential consideration in determining if a fiduciary duty exists is 
whether, under the circumstances of the case, the injured party justifiably trusted the 
defendant. If he did, the courts generally will find a fiduciary duty and subject the fiduciary to 
high standards of fairness and significant procedural burdens.”). Id. at 744. 
 93. Id. at 744–45. 
 94. Id. at 745. 
 95. Sultans of Swap, supra note 45, at 1877. 
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incentives, and professional expertise—liable in damages for defects 
in the contractarian process.”96 By ignoring the great differences 
among mediators who function in different institutional settings, 
Chaykin’s argument “failed to account for the qualitative differences 
between the contractarian processes that mediators facilitate.”97 
Another article, written in the same year by Joseph Stulberg, 
explicitly disagreed with Chaykin’s assumptions regarding the 
mediator’s role.98 Stulberg instead advocated that legislation be 
drafted holding a mediator “completely immune from legal liability 
for all actions undertaken in his role as a mediator.”99 Yet in spite of 
his direct and complete dismissal of Chaykin’s thesis that mediators 
might be liable for fiduciary duties, Stulberg conceded that when a 
mediator deliberately provides incorrect information in order to 
improve one party’s position at the expense of the other, a 
compelling argument might be made that such conduct violates a 
mediator’s duty to the parties.100 As such, it is not a “mediating act” 
warranting immunity.101 However, while Stulberg agreed with 
Chaykin that liability might attach as an analytical matter in such 
circumstances, he argued it would be too difficult to prove in 
reality.102 
Thus, while these articles, written soon after Chaykin’s article, 
adamantly criticized his argument that mediators should be held to 
formal fiduciary duties, they either directly or implicitly accepted at 
least the premise that mediators might be held liable in some 
circumstances for misconduct relating to duties typically owed by 
fiduciaries. However, both of these authors ultimately dismissed 
Chaykin’s general idea of holding mediators liable as fiduciaries. This 
dismissal set the tone for subsequent decades of academic discussion 
of mediator liability. Later commentators generally continued to 
 
 96. Id. at 1883. 
 97. Id. at 1877. 
 98. Stulberg, supra note 53, at 85 (“I disagree with Professor Chaykin’s assumptions 
regarding the mediator’s role, and consequently, find his conclusions regarding mediator 
liability unpersuasive.”). 
 99. Id. But see Hughes, supra note 54, at 111 (“Mediator immunity represents the 
inequitable shifting of risk of mediator misconduct from the mediators and the courts to those 
mediation participants least able to protect themselves from or shoulder the burden of such 
negative behavior.”). 
 100. Stulberg, supra note 53, at 87. 
 101. Id. 
 102. Id. 
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argue that mediation did not qualify as even an informal fiduciary 
relationship. 
Writing several years after Chaykin’s article, Michael Moffitt also 
admited that “[a]s a theoretical matter, an injured mediation party 
could assert that the mediator’s behavior constituted a breach of 
fiduciary obligations.”103 Yet he argues that “[a]t best, fiduciary 
obligations involve highly flexible standards that would produce 
relatively uncertain—even perhaps chaotic or ‘idiosyncratic’—
treatment.”104 Thus, he concludes that fiduciary obligations could 
extend into the realm of mediation “only with a degree of judicial 
adaptation,” which he claims is “unlikely to be forthcoming.”105 In 
addition to his concern over the “chaotic” nature of fiduciary law, 
Moffitt echoes concerns of other critics in identifying obstacles to 
applying fiduciary law to mediators, such as the lack of a fixed 
standard by which to judge mediator obligations, the lack of a 
position of superiority sufficient to warrant fiduciary status, and the 
structural difficulty of asserting simultaneous fiduciary duties to 
parties with opposing interests. Moffitt warns that “[f]iduciary 
obligations cannot be structured responsibly in a way that would 
damn the mediator no matter what she did, yet holding a fiduciary 
obligation simultaneously to opposing parties risks exactly that.”106 
Similarly, other critics have argued that the nature of the fiduciary 
obligation fits uneasily with the mediator’s dual obligations to 
adverse parties. 
In spite of the skepticism of most scholars since Chaykin, a few 
scholars and mediators have recently indicated that fiduciary duties 
might be a strong possibility in the future of mediation. For 
example, in 2000 David Bristow and Jesmond Parke warned of the 
“gathering storm” of mediator liability and argued that rather than 
immunity from liability, the nature of alternative dispute resolution 
professions indicates that mediators “expose themselves to great risk 
of liability.”107 Bristow and Parke argue that breach of fiduciary duty 
is among the potential claims “just over the horizon” for 
 
 103. Moffitt, supra note 24, at 167 (emphasis added). 
 104. Id. at 168 (quoting Chaykin, supra note 10, at 748). 
 105. Id. 
 106. Id.; see also LAURENCE BOULLE & MIRYANA NESIC, MEDIATION: PRINCIPLES 
PROCESS PRACTICE 519 (2001). 
 107. Bristow & Parke, supra note 73, at 19. 
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mediators.108 They conclude that “[i]n the context of mediation, the 
concept of fiduciary duties is ideal for the assessment of liability” 
because the mediator acts for the benefit of the clients, and a 
relationship implying and necessitating great trust, reliance, and 
confidence exists.109 In particular, they explain that 
[m]ediators are often called upon not only for their expertise in a 
particular field but also for their ability to mediate or guide a 
process of negotiation. Expectations are high in their performance 
of these duties. They are required to be neutral, objective, well-
versed in the field they mediate or arbitrate, and to be sensitive to 
confidential information.110 
In 2004, Alvin Zimmerman similarly stated to a symposium on 
mediator accountability, “I suggest to you that each of us serves in a 
fiduciary capacity. . . . I think the moment we step into a mediation 
role—the moment we enter the room as a neutral and it is found 
that we are not neutral—we have misrepresented ourselves.”111 He 
claims it is too “myopic” to think that one must have a single client 
to be a fiduciary.112 He argues that “[w]hether misrepresentation 
comes in the form of negligence or in the form of actual 
misrepresentation or fraud, it constitutes a breach of fiduciary duty,” 
and he warns that for an “inventive plaintiff lawyer, any of those 
concepts can be seized upon for liability.”113 With the theoretical 
basis of fiduciary liability for mediators accepted by some and the 
practical application of the theory increasingly being promoted by 
others in recent years, it is important for mediators as well as plaintiff 
attorneys to be aware of the concerns and the strengths relating to 
the argument that mediators are at least potential fiduciaries. 
Almost assuredly, mediation will never reach the formal degree 
of fiduciary duty that attorneys, trustees, and corporate officers 
possess—and that Chaykin argued for in his 1984 article114—because 
of the lower degrees of power, control, discretion, and dominance 
entrusted to mediators. But certain qualities inherent, or at least 
 
 108. Id. 
 109. Id. at 20. 
 110. Id. at 19. 
 111. Zimmerman et al., supra note 73, at 62. 
 112. Id. 
 113. Id. 
 114. Chaykin, supra note 10, at 745. 
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common, in mediation relationships serve to establish the potential, 
and even likelihood, that future courts might extend informal 
fiduciary duties to mediators under certain factual circumstances. 
Trust is arguably an essential element of mediation, for there 
exists a relationship implying and necessitating a great deal of 
reliance, confidence, and trust in the mediator on the part of the 
client in order to make the process run effectively. One scholar 
noted, “[t]he development of trust is a crucial aspect of both the 
dispute resolution and education functions of mediation.”115 Such a 
high degree of trust and reliance helps to establish a relationship of 
confidence and thus facilitates the creation of an informal fiduciary 
relationship. The confidentiality requirements of a mediation 
relationship also increase the probability that a fiduciary relationship 
will exist, especially in a jurisdiction that allows mediators an 
evidentiary privilege to protect mediation confidentiality. The 
increasing professionalism of mediation also lends itself well to a 
fiduciary analysis, and if a mediator is licensed or credentialed, it will 
likely increase the chances of being a fiduciary.116 Additionally, as 
more standardized regulations for mediation are adopted, it will 
become easier to establish a standard by which to judge liability for 
violation of any duties owed by mediators.117 
Other fact-specific qualities in each mediation relationship may 
also contribute to the finding of fiduciary liability. For example, if a 
mediator is a professional, full-time problem solver hired by the 
disputant for a substantial fee, a higher level of legal accountability 
may be appropriate due to the heightened formality of the 
relationship, the mediator’s level of expertise, the degree of 
compensation, and the reliance of the client upon the skills and 
experience of the mediator.118 This would especially be true if the 
 
 115. Peter A. Veglahn, Education by Third Party Neutrals: Functions, Methods, and 
Extent, 28 LAB. L.J. 20, 24 (1977). 
 116. See Alexander v. Culp, 705 N.E.2d 378, 382 (Ohio Ct. App. 1997) (stating that any 
professional—not exclusively licensed professionals―can be sued for professional negligence); 
 Moffitt, supra note 24, at 154 n.23 (“Regardless of whether mediation is considered a 
profession, a mediator will likely be held to owe a heightened duty of care toward her clients. 
The fact that a mediator may not be considered a ‘professional’ will not generally protect her 
from liability for professional negligence.”). 
 117. See supra note 62 and accompanying text. 
 118.  See Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 169–74, 178–79 (discussing the 
characteristics of a fiduciary and a fiduciary relationship that tend to heighten the magnitude of 
the fiduciary’s duty to the beneficiary). 
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breach was more than just negligence and in fact constituted a clear 
and intentional failure to fully disclose conflicts of interest, a breach 
of the confidentiality agreement, or a material misrepresentation 
regarding the mediator’s qualifications or impartiality.119 On the 
other hand, if the mediator is a neighborhood volunteer, 
uncompensated or minimally compensated, whose only claims to 
expertise are short training sessions, it is less likely that a court would 
apply the law of fiduciary duty, which would impose risks that would 
significantly deter volunteer entry into the mediation field or induce 
mediators to only accept paying clients. The degree of vulnerability 
and reliance, rather than the sophistication of the mediating clients, 
would also be a likely factor in establishing a fiduciary relationship, as 
would the existence of specificity in the promises involved in the 
contractual agreement.120 
All or some of these factors, as well as other relevant factors, 
would work to increase the clients’ expectations for the quality of 
work and duty from the mediator and would thus lead toward the 
finding of a fiduciary relationship. These factual characteristics of the 
circumstances surrounding mediation relationships and transactions 
are key examples of the factors included in the analytical framework 
described below. While the traditional approach to fiduciary law, as 
described below, results in little direction for when to apply fiduciary 
liability to informal relationships of trust, these factors, when 
analyzed under the framework below, help provide greater 
predictability. 
V. FINDING PREDICTABILITY IN FIDUCIARY LAW:  
THE SCHARFFS-WELCH FRAMEWORK 
In the face of the future likelihood of increasing lawsuits against 
mediators based on their quasi-fiduciary duties and the probable 
qualification of certain mediations as informal fiduciary relationships 
in the future, courts and mediators need to find a more predictable 
method than the complex and unwieldy traditional doctrinal 
approach to fiduciary law. Traditionally, courts have approached 
 
 119.  See id. at 209 (discussing a hierarchy of alleged breaches of fiduciary duty and noting 
that “a court is more likely to find liability for fiduciary conduct that can fairly be characterized 
as malfeasance as opposed to nonfeasance”). 
 120. See id. at 176–77, 185 (demonstrating that vulnerability and reliance of a beneficiary 
upon a fiduciary tend to increase the magnitude of duty owed by the fiduciary to the 
beneficiary). 
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fiduciary liability questions by applying established statutes or 
common law precedents to determine (1) whether a formal or 
informal fiduciary relationship exists between the two parties and (2) 
what duties the fiduciary owes to the beneficiaries and whether the 
fiduciary breached at least one of those duties.121 Because this 
traditional approach takes into account thousands of court rulings 
and statutes, the law of fiduciaries is not only a complex area of law 
but is also unpredictable and even inconsistent in determinations 
about when fiduciary relationships exist and which duties are owed in 
the context of that relationship. As one court has acknowledged, 
“[c]ourts have historically declined to offer a rigid definition of a 
fiduciary relationship in order to allow imposition of fiduciary duties 
where justified. Thus, the relationship can arise in a variety of 
circumstances, and may stem from varied and unpredictable 
factors.”122 This leads to various courts coming to different and 
conflicting conclusions about whether similar types of relationships 
constitute fiduciary relationships and whether similar types of 
behavior constitute breaches of duties. Focusing solely on the 
traditional case by case questions of whether a fiduciary relationship 
exists and whether any duty has been breached provides no 
predictability for a mediator or other potential informal fiduciary to 
determine when a court is likely to apply fiduciary duties or to attach 
fiduciary liability for alleged breaches of duties. 
While the multitude of relevant fiduciary cases and statutes 
provide no comprehensive or systematic approach to this complex 
area of the law, Professors Brett G. Scharffs and John W. Welch 
recently developed a fact-intensive analytical framework that provides 
an organizing principle to the different ways courts have dealt with 
fiduciary law.123 Professors Scharffs and Welch developed this 
framework (the “Scharffs-Welch framework”) in response to the 
inadequacy of traditional approaches to fiduciary law, observing, 
“The formulaic application of doctrinal categories often does as 
much to obfuscate as it does to illuminate the likely outcome of a 
particular case.”124 Particularly, they claim that “[f]ocusing 
exclusively upon whether a fiduciary relationship exists, and whether 
 
 121. See id. at 164–65 (describing the traditional “doctrinal approach” to fiduciary law). 
 122. HAJMM Co. v. House of Raeford Farms, Inc., 403 S.E.2d 483, 489 (N.C. 1991) 
(citations omitted). 
 123. See Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9. 
 124. Id. at 165. 
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a particular duty has been breached is often not particularly helpful 
in trying to determine whether a court is likely to find that there has 
been an actionable breach of fiduciary duty.”125 In light of the 
unpredictability and inconsistencies inherent in this traditional 
approach, the Scharffs-Welch framework is designed to provide 
guidance for practitioners as well as courts through the maze of 
fiduciary law. 
In developing this new guide to approaching fiduciary law, 
Professors Scharffs and Welch analyzed a myriad of cases involving 
alleged breaches of fiduciary duty in a broad array of relationships. 
Their research collectively revealed as many as thirty factors routinely 
considered by courts when determining whether to apply fiduciary 
duties to a relationship and whether to hold a fiduciary liable for 
breach of those duties.126 Scharffs and Welch then analyzed the 
applicable factors tending to either heighten or lower the likelihood 
of a court holding a fiduciary liable for breach of duty. This analysis 
revealed several underlying principles that effectively illuminate and 
organize the often conflicting and seemingly irreconcilable decisions 
in fiduciary duty case law.127 By basing their analytical framework on 
these organizing principles, Scharffs and Welch provide a new 
approach to fiduciary law that reveals a greater degree of 
predictability and consistency in fiduciary law than traditional 
approaches have revealed. 
The Scharffs-Welch framework compiles the key factors that 
courts have regularly considered in approaching fiduciary law and 
breaks these characteristics down into three related inquiries to assess 
the magnitude of both duties and breaches on a sliding scale.128 First, 
the framework goes beyond the question of whether a fiduciary 
relationship exists and instead focuses on the magnitude of duty 
arising within a particular relationship of trust. This determination of 
how high of a duty is owed by a fiduciary is based on several factual 
characteristics, including the fiduciary’s position, expertise, 
dominance, amount of control and discretion entrusted, amount of 
compensation, and whether the fiduciary serves in a full-time or part-
time capacity; the beneficiary’s vulnerability or sophistication; the 
 
 125. Id. at 166. 
 126. See id. 
 127. See id. 
 128. See id. at 166–67. 
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formality, expectations, specificity of promises, voluntariness, relative 
power, reliance, divergence of interests, and negotiation involved in 
the relationship; and the significance of the subject matter 
involved.129 Second, the framework evaluates the magnitude of the 
alleged breach of that duty, based on factors such as the following: 
the magnitude, frequency, and duration of the harm; the character of 
the fiduciary’s deliberative process; the character of the fiduciary’s 
motives, presence of greed, or conflicts of interest; and the 
classification, such as disclosure or fraud, of the alleged breach.130 
Third, the framework looks to the context of the breach to 
determine the appropriate degree of damages required.131 
By evaluating both the magnitude of the fiduciary duty in a 
relationship of trust as well as the magnitude of the breach of that 
duty, the Scharffs-Welch framework provides an effective tool to 
predict the likelihood for liability. It allows a practitioner, legal 
counsel, or judge to analyze the situation under the factors and then 
to determine whether the specific characteristics of the mediation 
relationship in question are of a high enough magnitude in the duty 
and the breach to warrant liability. In their article introducing their 
new approach to fiduciary law, Professors Scharffs and Welch apply 
the framework to educators and demonstrate that the framework 
provides an effective model to accurately predict when courts will 
apply fiduciary duties to educators.132 They explain that the 
framework “is useful in evaluating a broad array of fiduciary 
relationships and is particularly helpful in the complex and 
multifaceted area of evaluating alleged breaches of duty by teachers 
and educators.”133 Specifically, Scharffs and Welch demonstrate that 
under the traditional approach, an “overly simplistic application of 
doctrines such as ‘duty of care’ and ‘duty of loyalty’ may result in 
outcomes that are difficult to explain or reconcile with other 
decisions.”134 With consideration of magnitude of both duty and 
breach under the Scharffs-Welch framework, however, “an 
underlying consistency and coherence in the decisions begins to 
 
 129. Id. at Part III.A. 
 130. Id. at Part III.B. 
 131. Id. at Part III.C. 
 132. Id. at Part IV. 
 133. Id. at 168. 
 134. Id. 
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come into focus, albeit of an imperfect and sometimes contestable 
nature.”135 
This consistency and predictability results from the underlying 
trends revealed by the analysis of Professors Scharffs and Welch.136 
Their research revealed that when a fiduciary owes a high magnitude 
of duty and then also breaches that duty in a way that constitutes a 
high magnitude under the Scharffs-Welch framework, courts have 
been most likely to attach fiduciary liability and apply an available 
and appropriate remedy. But if the duty owed is of a low magnitude 
and the breach of that duty is also of a low degree of seriousness, 
courts are least likely to attach fiduciary liability to a particular person 
in a relationship of trust. For all other cases that fall somewhere in 
the middle of the two sliding scales of magnitude of duty and 
breach, the likelihood that a court will attach fiduciary liability 
increases as the magnitude of either the duty or breach increases. 
Thus, since formal fiduciaries such as attorneys, corporate officers, 
and trustees are held to a high magnitude of duty, they are often 
found liable for breaches of those duties even when the breaches are 
of a relatively low degree of seriousness. Conversely, fiduciaries with 
a relatively lower degree of fiduciary duty, such a teachers, parents, 
coaches, or travel agents, are rarely held liable under fiduciary law 
unless their misconduct qualifies as an egregious breach. 
When applied to mediation relationships, the Scharffs-Welch 
framework provides much-needed predictability for mediators to 
determine which, if any, fiduciary duties apply to them and whether 
they will likely be found liable for certain alleged breaches of those 
duties. Yet the framework also maintains the necessary flexibility to 
not stifle or overly regulate the varied mediation profession.137 While 
all mediation relationships will probably not rise to a relationship of 
fiduciary duty, the factors laid out in the Scharffs-Welch framework 
provide a guide for determining the likelihood, in particular factual 
circumstances, that a court might find a mediator liable for fiduciary 
obligations in the future. By considering both the magnitude of the 
duty and the magnitude of the breach, the framework provides a way 
to determine whether a particular breach in a mediation relationship 
 
 135. Id. 
 136. See id. at 167–68. 
 137. See id. at 167 (claiming that the Scharffs-Welch framework “inherently recognizes 
that fiduciary duties are not created equal, and all breaches will not be regarded as equally 
harmful”). 
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warrants liability. Although courts have not yet subjected any 
mediators to fiduciary liability and have continued to apply only the 
traditional doctrinal approach to analyzing fiduciary relationships, 
this framework helps predict the potential for future litigation against 
mediators as more claims are brought and as views about mediation 
become more formalized. When applied to the existing handful of 
cases against mediators brought under claims of misconduct, as 
discussed below, the framework illuminates the reasoning behind the 
rulings and clearly places the seemingly disconnected and even 
arbitrary decisions into a pattern that will allow for future findings of 
fiduciary liability against mediators. 
The only case recorded in the federal reporters involving a claim 
of fiduciary duty against a mediator provides a noteworthy example 
of the potential for a court to eventually attach fiduciary liability to 
certain mediators if the circumstances amount to a high enough 
magnitude of breach. In Lehrer v. Zwernemann, the plaintiff sought 
to hold his two attorneys, opposing counsel, and the mediator liable 
for “negligence or legal malpractice, breach of contract, breach of 
fiduciary duty, Texas Deceptive Trade Practices Act violations, fraud, 
and conspiracy to commit fraud” based on several alleged grounds, 
including the failure of the mediator to disclose prior relationships 
with the opposing attorney.138 The trial court sustained a no 
evidence motion for summary judgment for the mediator, and the 
appellate court affirmed, finding that the plaintiff had failed to 
produce evidence that he had suffered legal injury as a result of the 
mediator’s actions at the mediation.139 The plaintiff argued that 
while the mediator represented himself as a third party neutral, he in 
fact had a conflict of interest which he did not disclose to the 
plaintiff.140 Rather than focus on particular duties or standards 
required of a mediator, the court took a functional approach. The 
court concluded that the “primary obligation” of a mediator is “to 
facilitate a settlement,” which the defendant accomplished.141 
Summary judgment in favor of the mediator was ultimately affirmed 
because the plaintiff could not demonstrate evidence of any injury 
caused by the mediator’s misconduct and the plaintiff had at least 
 
 138. Lehrer v. Zwernemann, 14 S.W.3d 775, 776 (Tex. App. 2000). 
 139. Id. at 776–78. 
 140. Id. at 777. 
 141. Id. 
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constructive knowledge of the prior professional relationship with 
the opposing attorney.142 Since the court did not specifically address 
the validity of applying fiduciary duties to a mediator, this opinion 
leaves the possibility open. The opinion also implies that such a claim 
for breach of fiduciary duty might be successful if the plaintiff could 
present additional evidence of a more substantial legal injury. In the 
terms of the Scharffs-Welch framework, Lehrer represents a low 
magnitude of fiduciary duty (since mediators owe lower duties than 
formal fiduciaries) coupled with a low magnitude of breach (since 
the breach resulted in no discernable legal injury); thus, fiduciary 
duties would not attach under the Scharffs-Welch framework. 
Courts have also addressed a handful of other cases brought 
against mediators for misconduct in which fiduciary duty claims were 
not raised but in which the court rulings, when analyzed under the 
Scharffs-Welch framework, include rationales relevant to the future 
application of fiduciary duties to mediators. While these cases have 
little precedential value since they come from lower courts and only 
tangentially consider issues of fiduciary duties, they are nevertheless 
instructive of how courts might consider future claims based on 
fiduciary law. 
In 2003, a California court found that mediators do owe certain 
duties of care and loyalty to parties of the mediation and that 
mediators are in a position of potentially significant influence over 
parties to a mediation. In Furia v. Helm, the court held that 
although the defendant was an attorney, he was acting in the 
capacity of a mediator and had fully disclosed his role as a mediator 
and not an attorney in the proceedings.143 Thus, the court held that 
no attorney-client relationship arose, so the attorney-mediator did 
not owe fiduciary obligations to the plaintiff.144 The court went on, 
however, to emphasize that in spite of the lack of an attorney-client 
relationship, “an attorney agreeing to act as a neutral mediator for 
the conflicting parties” did in fact assume duties to both parties 
involved in the mediation.145 
While the Furia court chose not to “explore the full dimensions 
of that duty,” it found that such a duty owed by a mediator 
 
 142. Id. at 778. 
 143. Furia v. Helm, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357, 363–64 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 144. Id. at 364. 
 145. Id. 
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“certainly” included the duty of full disclosure to the parties about 
the mediator’s potential conflicts of interest or lack of impartiality.146 
Specifically, the court stated, “we have no doubt that an attorney 
accepting the role of mediator has the same duty of full disclosure as 
an attorney accepting the representation of clients with actual or 
potentially conflicting interests.”147 The court also stated that an 
attorney-mediator assumes the duty of performing as a mediator 
with the skill and prudence ordinarily to be expected of one 
performing that role.148 Thus, when considering this case under the 
Scharffs-Welch framework, the factual analysis indicates that the 
defendant’s expertise and title of attorney heightened the magnitude 
of his duty, although his status as a mediator kept that duty lower 
than it would have been if he had been acting in the capacity of an 
attorney rather than a mediator.149 
Finally, the Furia court made the crucial finding that while 
“[m]ediators may not provide legal advice . . . they are in a position 
to influence the positions taken by the conflicting parties whose 
dispute they are mediating.”150 This suggests that the element of 
influence, which is necessary in order to find a fiduciary relationship, 
exists in a mediation relationship in spite of the court’s assertion that 
fiduciary duties only apply to attorneys. The court further 
demonstrated the special influence of a mediator, and thus the 
vulnerability of the clients, by stating, “A party to mediation may 
well give more weight to the suggestions of the mediator if under 
the belief that the mediator is neutral than if that party regards the 
mediator as aligned with the interests of the adversary.”151 For these 
reasons, the court concluded that “before an attorney agrees to serve 
for compensation as a mediator, there must be ‘complete disclosure 
of all facts and circumstances which, in the attorney’s honest 
judgment, may influence the party’s choice, holding the attorney 
civilly liable for loss caused by lack of disclosure.’”152 Thus, the court 
 
 146. Id. 
 147. Id. at 365. 
 148. Id. 
 149. See Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 179. 
 150. Furia, 4 Cal. Rptr. at 365 (“‘The mediator’s role is simply to facilitate the parties’ 
direct negotiations,’ but ‘this is not a hard and fast rule. Many mediators do in fact offer their 
opinions.’” (quoting KNIGHT ET AL., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE 
RESOLUTION ¶¶ 3:120, 3:121(1992))). 
 151. Id. 
 152. Id. (quoting Ishmael v. Millington, 50 Cal. Rptr. 592, 596 (Ct. App. 1966)). 
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in Furia explicitly stated that a mediator-attorney might be found 
civilly liable in his role as a mediator for breaching the duty of full-
disclosure of conflicts and for misrepresenting his lack of impartiality. 
The court’s reasoning and the outcome of Furia are thus consistent 
with the Scharffs-Welch framework in that the vulnerability of the 
clients as well as the influence and expertise of the mediator 
heightens the magnitude of duty that mediators owe. 
Additionally, a district court in New York has attempted to 
establish a general standard of care for mediators, indicating that if 
the facts had involved a higher magnitude of breach, the court would 
have attached liability. In the 2002 case Chang’s Imports v. Srader, a 
trademark licensor brought a negligence action against an attorney 
who mediated a settlement agreement between the licensor and its 
licensee.153 On the defendant’s motion for summary judgment, the 
court dismissed the negligence claim and held that the defendant was 
not acting as an attorney for either party but rather was acting as a 
neutral mediator and thus was not negligent.154 Although the court 
found that as a mediator the defendant lacked the higher duty 
necessary to establish a negligence claim,155 a deeper analysis of this 
case indicates that given different factual circumstances, the attorney-
mediator might have been found liable under the court’s reasoning. 
The negligence alleged in the claim was based largely on the 
accusation that the attorney-mediator was providing legal 
representation to two clients with adverse interests.156 Thus, the 
negligence claim was fundamentally based on the status of the 
mediator as an attorney, since such dual representation is prohibited 
when providing legal representation but is inherent when providing 
mediation. The court stated that “a mediator cannot be held to a 
higher degree of skill and care than that commonly exercised by 
ordinary members of the relevant mediation community.”157 
Therefore, if the alleged negligence had instead been based on a 
violation connected with his role of mediator, and if his skill and care 
were significantly below the typical standard for mediators, then the 
 
 153. Chang’s Imports, Inc. v. Srader, 216 F. Supp. 2d 325, 327 (S.D.N.Y. 2002). 
 154. Id. at 334. 
 155. Id. at 330. 
 156. See id. 
 157. Id. at 332–33. 
CLARK.PP2.DOC 10/25/2006 3:26:42 PM 
BRIGHAM YOUNG UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW [2006 
1066 
attorney-mediator might have been held liable.158 Additionally, the 
court emphasized the fact that the defendant adequately and 
accurately defined his role and fully disclosed his conflicting interests 
in the waiver signed by both parties before the mediation began.159 
Like Furia, the ruling in Chang’s Imports is also consistent with 
factors indicating a lower magnitude of breach under the Scharffs-
Welch framework. The framework helps explain the outcome of this 
case. As a mediator the defendant had a lower level of duty, which 
was heightened to a certain degree by his status and sophistication as 
an attorney, but which was lessened by his disclosure to both parties 
that he represented both their interests. Thus, the parties could not 
reasonably rely on him to solely promote their individual interests 
and so no fiduciary duty was found. Also, since the court found that 
he did not fail to disclose his conflicts, nor did he misrepresent his 
impartiality, any negligence which he may have committed would 
not be a serious enough magnitude of breach to warrant holding 
him liable for a breach of a minimal duty. Although the court does 
not specifically mention fiduciary liability in this case, it leaves open 
the possibility that under different circumstances, such as a failure to 
fully disclose a conflict of interest or a material misrepresentation of 
qualifications or ability to be impartial, the court might have found 
differently and held him to a higher magnitude of duty and breach. 
The reasoning behind the rulings in Lehrer, Furia, and Chang’s 
Imports, when considered in the context of the Scharffs-Welch 
framework, indicates that mediators may be held civilly liable in the 
future if they violate important duties owed to clients, such as 
impartiality and full disclosure of conflicts of interest. This liability 
would likely extend to fiduciary duties for mediators in cases where 
the clients can show a special reliance by the clients on the 
 
 158. Currently, a finding for mediator negligence liability would be problematic because, 
as the court in Chang’s Imports noted, “[t]here is almost no law on what the appropriate 
standard of care is, if any, for a mediator who helps negotiate a settlement between parties.” 
Id. at 332. However, as the UMA and other legislation and regulations are passed which 
provide comprehensive standards for mediators, this requirement will be more easily met and 
mediators’ exposure to negligence liability, or malpractice, will likely increase. See Hedges, 
supra note 31, at 1563 (“The UMA permits disclosure of a mediation communication, as an 
exception to the mediation privilege, if the communication is sought or offered to prove or 
disprove a claim or complaint ‘of professional misconduct or malpractice’ against a mediator. . . 
. If New Jersey passes the UMA with that language, it might be possible to argue that the 
legislature has indirectly created a new cause of action of professional misconduct or 
professional malpractice for mediators, where one did not exists before.”). 
 159. Chang’s Imports, 216 F. Supp. 2d at 331. 
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mediator’s impartiality and neutral status as well as the influence of 
the mediator over the parties, as described in Furia v. Helm. 
VI. APPLYING THE SCHARFFS-WELCH FRAMEWORK TO ADDRESS 
CONCERNS OF CRITICS 
As shown in the sections above, not only is it likely that fiduciary 
duty claims will be increasingly filed against mediators, it is also likely 
that future courts will apply fiduciary liability to mediators for serious 
misconduct. When courts apply fiduciary law to these future claims 
with a more consistent and predictable approach, such as the 
Scharffs-Welch framework described above, the law of fiduciary 
duties will be able to provide an effective and appropriate tool to 
define and regulate the obligations of mediators to their clients. 
While there are several concerns voiced by critics regarding the 
extension, or potential extension, of fiduciary liability to mediators, 
this section will focus on three major arguments which have been 
raised regarding (1) the unwieldiness of fiduciary law, (2) the lack of 
superiority of mediators resulting from their inability to pass 
judgment, and (3) the dual obligations to parties with conflicting 
interests. While these fears have been obstacles to extending fiduciary 
liability to mediators for the past two decades, the strength of these 
concerns dissolves upon closer analysis. 
A. Fiduciary Law: Unwieldy or Flexible? 
First, several critics warn that fiduciary law is too chaotic, 
unpredictable, and varied to provide a comprehensive standard with 
which to judge the fiduciary status and liability of mediators.160 
Michael Moffitt, for example, argues that because of this uncertain 
and even chaotic system of standards used by courts to determine the 
existence of fiduciary relationships, “[f]iduciary obligations 
constitute a sloppy mechanism for creating mediator obligations—
one that is very unlikely to be available to prospective litigants.”161 
Another article critical of the fiduciary model endorses a more 
flexible model for analyzing fiduciary relationships in order to take 
into account the wide range of types of mediation and types of 
 
 160. See, e.g., Moffitt, supra note 24, at 168–69. 
 161. Id. at 169. 
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fiduciaries.162 Specifically, it voices concern that fiduciary law cannot 
encompass all types of mediators and thus is not appropriate as a 
standard by which to judge mediator liability.163 
The Scharffs-Welch framework provides just such a flexible 
model and is particularly useful in determining the potential 
existence of fiduciary duties in informal fiduciary relationships where 
the determination is entirely fact-specific. Professors Scharffs and 
Welch describe their framework as helpful because it “inherently 
recognizes that all fiduciary duties are not created equal, and that all 
breaches will not be regarded as equally harmful.”164 This framework 
organizes the chaos of fiduciary law by providing a compilation of 
the factors and categories of factors used most often by courts to 
determine fiduciary status. This approach leads to flexible analysis 
because it allows courts to choose the most relevant factors 
applicable to the case at hand. The framework overcomes the 
apparent unpredictability of fiduciary law by clarifying the implicit 
balancing test between magnitude of duty and magnitude of breach 
used by courts to determine whether fiduciary liability applies. 
The Scharffs-Welch framework shows that not all mediation 
relationships would be potentially held to the higher level of 
fiduciary duty but rather that certain factors provide reasonable 
grounds for certain types of mediation—those with high levels of 
expertise, reliance, trust, and compensation, for example—to be held 
to this higher standard. In this respect, although Chaykin’s premise 
of holding mediators liable under fiduciary law was valid, the 
criticisms were correct that his absolute, even per se, categorization 
of mediators as fiduciaries was too expansive and ignored the wide 
variations among mediators.165 But critics should not dismiss the 
fiduciary approach simply because it does not apply to all mediators, 
or rather because mediators cannot be categorized as formal 
fiduciaries. Such variance is an integral part of the designation of 
informal fiduciaries as opposed to formal fiduciaries, and it is this 
flexibility, in fact, which makes a fiduciary analysis ideal for 
determining the liability of members of a profession as varied as 
mediation.166 
 
 162. Sultans of Swap, supra note 45, at 1883. 
 163. Id. 
 164. Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 167. 
 165. See, e.g., Sultans of Swap, supra note 45, at 1883. 
 166. See supra notes 38–42 and accompanying text. 
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B. Lack of Superiority 
Opponents of the theory of finding fiduciary duties in mediation 
relationships argue that a plaintiff seeking to establish a mediator’s 
fiduciary obligation would be challenged to demonstrate that the 
mediator occupied a position of superiority and influence sufficient 
to warrant fiduciary status.167 The court in Furia v. Helm held that 
while “mediators may not provide legal advice . . . they are in a 
position to influence the positions taken by the conflicting parties 
whose dispute they are mediating.”168 Further, “[a] party to 
mediation may well give more weight to the suggestions of the 
mediator if under the belief that the mediator is neutral than if that 
party regards the mediator as aligned with the interests of the 
adversary.”169 Moffitt points out that, unlike an agent, attorney, 
officer, or trustee, “a mediator is not empowered by the party to 
make decisions on behalf of the party.”170 
This is true when a mediator strictly limits his actions to 
facilitating the negotiation; however, it has been observed that many 
mediators now engage in evaluative mediation in which the mediator 
steps beyond the traditional role of facilitator and engages in 
determining the outcome of the mediation.171 Such evaluative 
mediating would likely heighten the magnitude of duty of a 
mediator because it would constitute greater influence and even 
superiority in some circumstances. Moffitt even acknowledges that a 
“mediator who engages in case evaluation increases her exposure to 
liability because the process of evaluation almost certainly falls within 
the parameters of the practice of law.”172 
 
 167. See Moffitt, supra note 24, at 168; 36A C.J.S. FIDUCIARY 383 (1961) (noting that 
influence and superiority are necessary factors in declaring fiduciary status). 
 168. Furia v. Helm, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d 357, 365 (Ct. App. 2003). 
 169. Id. 
 170. See Moffitt, supra note 24, at 168–69. 
 171. Furia, 4 Cal. Rptr. 3d at 363–64 (“‘The mediator’s role is simply to facilitate the 
parties’ direct negotiations,’ but ‘this is not a hard and fast rule. Many mediators do in fact 
offer their opinions.’” (quoting KNIGHT ET AL., CAL. PRACTICE GUIDE: ALTERNATIVE 
DISPUTE RESOLUTION ¶¶ 3:120, 3:121(1992))); AM. BAR ASS’N ET AL., supra note 32, at 7 
(limiting a mediator’s ability to shift to a more evaluative or adjudicatory role without notice to 
and consent of the parties). However, these standards have not yet been adopted by most 
states and thus have no legally binding value. 
 172. Moffitt, supra note 24, at 170 n.83; see, e.g., Lela P. Love, The Top Ten Reasons Why 
Mediators Should Not Evaluate, 24 FLA. ST. U. L. REV. 937, 938–39 (1997) (arguing that 
evaluative mediators combine roles that are incompatible). 
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Additionally, a highly qualified mediator can arguably have 
enough experience to establish a fiduciary relationship by producing 
an imbalance of position sufficient to constitute mediator superiority 
and client reliance and vulnerability. Thus, under situations in which 
the mediator takes the affirmative step to increase his level of 
superiority and influence, the mediator draws closer to incurring 
fiduciary liabilities. The Scharffs-Welch framework identifies the most 
relevant factors for a court to consider in making this determination 
of whether a mediator has reached a level of sufficient superiority, 
influence, and control to impose fiduciary duties.173 This 
identification of specific and quantifiable factors allows “lawyers, 
judges, and litigants to identify and produce all the evidence 
systematically relevant to a sound resolution of the case.”174 
C. Dual Obligations 
Critics have also maintained that mediators cannot be vested 
with fiduciary duties because, unlike traditional fiduciaries such as 
trustees and attorneys, mediators owe a duty to multiple parties with 
conflicting interests.175 This has elicited skepticism about the validity 
of applying fiduciary liability to mediators and statements that “[n]o 
courts . . . have accepted the underlying proposition that mediators 
somehow owe fiduciary duties simultaneously to two or more 
mediation parties.”176 Yet, as one scholar has observed, “the legal 
concept of fiduciary duty does not apply in the same way in 
mediation as it does in the traditional litigation model. . . . Indeed, 
fiduciary duty and confidentiality are relevant to mediation, but do 
not take the same meaning as in litigation.”177 Just as there are 
varying levels of fiduciary duties between those owed by business 
 
 173. Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 171–73 (describing how factors increasing a 
fiduciary’s expertise, control, and discretion tend to heighten the level of the fiduciary’s duty). 
 174. Id. at 168. 
 175. BOULLE & NESIC, supra note 106, at 519 (arguing that the nature of the fiduciary 
obligation fits uneasily with the mediator’s dual obligations to adverse parties); Moffit, supra 
note 24, at 168 (“[P]rospective plaintiff would need to overcome the structural difficulty of 
asserting that the mediator owes simultaneous fiduciary obligations to parties with opposing 
interests in the matter at hand. Fiduciary obligations cannot be structured responsibly in a way 
that would damn the mediator no matter what she did, yet holding a fiduciary obligation 
simultaneously to opposing parties risks exactly that.”). 
 176. See Moffitt, supra note 75, at 128. 
 177. Tad Kojima, Keeping Mediation an Alternative Dispute Resolution Process (2001), 
http://www.cfcj-fcjc.org/full-text/2001_dra/tad_kojima.html (last visited Oct. 3, 2005). 
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partners, attorneys, and trustees and those owed by informal 
fiduciaries like teachers, clergy, and parents, so is there a distinction 
in the height of duty of an attorney versus the type of duty of a 
mediator. 
The Scharffs-Welch framework acknowledges this spectrum of 
duties among fiduciaries and provides a way to apply fiduciary law 
appropriately to account for differing levels of duties and breaches.178 
Among the factors listed regarding the characteristics and history of a 
potential fiduciary relationship, the Scharffs-Welch framework 
includes the element of exclusivity as an important characteristic to 
consider when determining the magnitude of fiduciary duties.179 
Professors Scharffs and Welch explain, “if a fiduciary represents 
multiple beneficiaries, we would expect that this would sometimes 
result in a somewhat lower magnitude of duty.”180 Although a lack of 
exclusivity in the relationship might lower the magnitude of a 
fiduciary’s duty to a beneficiary, under the Scharffs-Welch framework 
it does not necessarily preclude the attachment of some fiduciary 
duties. The framework demonstrates that a high magnitude of 
breach can offset a relatively low magnitude of duty.181 Professors 
Scharffs and Welch, in applying their analytical framework to 
educators, demonstrate case law in which fiduciary duties have been 
extended to professors for serious breaches of trust.182 In these 
examples, the fact that the relevant educators simultaneously owed 
potentially conflicting duties to other students did not shield the 
professors from fiduciary liability for extreme breaches of certain 
fiduciary duties. 
 
 178. Scharffs & Welch, supra note 9, at 167. 
 179. Id. at 182–83. 
 180. Id. (“For example, a manager for an artist or athlete who works exclusively for that 
individual is likely to be held to a relatively higher magnitude of duty than an agent who 
represents multiple artists or athletes.”). 
 181. Id. at 167–68. 
 182. Id. at 219–29; see Chou v. Univ. of Chi., 254 F.3d 1347, 1362–63 (Fed. Cir. 2001) 
(holding a supervising professor liable for breach of fiduciary duty for telling the inventor-
student that his ideas could not be patented and then filing a patent application listing the 
professor as the sole inventor); Johnson v. Schmitz, 119 F. Supp. 2d 90, 97 (D. Conn. 2000) 
(denying Yale University’s motion to dismiss a claim for breach of fiduciary duty against a 
dissertation committee for discouraging a student’s use of his ideas and then misappropriating 
the ideas for the professors’ own use); Schneider v. Plymouth State Coll., 744 A.2d 101, 104 
(N.H. 1999) (“[I]n the context of sexual harassment by faculty members, the relationship 
between a post-secondary institution and its students is a fiduciary one.”). 
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Professor Nolan-Haley similarly described a mediator’s dual 
obligations as consistent, arguing that “the mediator is said to 
represent the integrity of the mediation process and it is in this sense 
then that the mediator has a special fiduciary relationship with both 
parties to a dispute.”183 Further, as Chaykin argued, “[i]n both 
trustee and corporate situations, it is not uncommon for the parties 
to whom fiduciary duties are owed to assert conflicting, adverse 
interests.”184 He points to the examples of corporate actors who 
must balance between the potentially conflicting interests of 
shareholders, directors, officers, and employees, all to whom he owes 
fiduciary duties.185 Likewise, Chaykin argues, “[t]he existence of 
adverse interests among beneficiaries in no way alters the trustee’s 
responsibility. His duty remains one of fairness and impartiality, and 
he must act in the best interest of the entire trust.”186 
Thus, certain duties do not necessarily change just because the 
two parties to whom a fiduciary owes the duties have adverse 
interests in the transaction. In order to preserve fairness, openness, 
and impartiality in the mediation process, mediators should be 
obligated to maintain confidentiality, to fully disclose conflicts of 
interest, to act in good faith, and to make no false 
misrepresentations. These duties constitute non-conflicting interests 
of all parties involved and thus the mediator can fulfill his duty to 
work for the benefit of both parties within this context. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Although most scholars and courts have not yet recognized 
fiduciary liability for mediators, recent trends indicate that at least 
some legal mediation relationships will likely be future additions to 
the expanding list of informal fiduciaries. While courts themselves 
will likely continue to apply the traditional doctrinal approach to 
fiduciary law when analyzing duties of mediators, the Scharffs-Welch 
framework helps mediators to more accurately predict when and to 
what extent such fiduciary duties will apply to particular factual 
 
 183. Jacqueline M. Nolan-Haley, Informed Consent in Mediation: A Guiding Principle 
for Truly Educated Decisionmaking, 74 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 775, 826 (1999). 
 184. Chaykin, supra note 10, at 739 n.40. 
 185. Id. (citing Broad v. Rockwell Int’l Corp., 614 F.2d 418, 430–32 (5th Cir. 1980)). 
 186. Id. (citing First Nat’l Bank of Birmingham v. Ingalls, 59 So. 2d 914, 921–23 (Ala. 
1952)). 
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circumstances of each mediation relationship. The framework is thus 
a useful tool for clarifying the complex and varied standards used in 
fiduciary law and for illuminating current case law that thus far has 
avoided extending fiduciary liability to mediators, demonstrating that 
the door is still open for courts to find some mediators to be 
fiduciaries in the future. 
Using this framework and analyzing the future of the mediation 
profession in the context of recent trends also helps confront and 
overcome several of the concerns which have been voiced by 
opponents throughout the two decades of debate over extending 
fiduciary duties to mediators. This analysis demonstrates that in the 
future, mediators may likely owe some level of fiduciary obligations 
to the parties in certain mediation proceedings—primarily fairness, 
impartiality, confidentiality, disclosure of conflicts of interest, good 
faith, and no false misrepresentation. This knowledge allows 
mediators to prepare for the trends of the near future, when 
mediation will likely take an established place among the professions, 
with the accompanying benefits and liabilities of such a position. 
Rebekah Ryan Clark 
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